Introduction
Decisions made by monetary policy committees are among those with the largest impact on the economy. Although it is possible to define the best performance these committees should reach, it is less obvious how they can be assessed in practice. These committees are made of people making decisions and the obvious question to ask is how good are these people's decisions on economic performance? We can probably agree on some standard volatility of production growth and inflation as criteria for the performance and we can probably rank the performance of the monetary policy committees (MPC) relatively to each other. In other words, given the existing diversity across actual monetary institutions, how do we measure the influence of the composition of monetary policy committees and of the background of committee members on monetary policy performance?
In this paper, we answer this question by empirically assessing the impact of the characteristics of monetary policy committees' members on the macroeconomic performance of their economies. To achieve this objective, we study the efficiency of monetary policy committees at managing a measure of economic performance, i.e. the inflation-output volatility trade off, and we look at how their members' personal background determines this performance.
Monetary policy management raises important questions, such as how effective a given structure is at reaching a policy objective and how, in a given structure, the resource mix is able to lead to an optimal policy? Consequently, the objective of this paper is to identify the performance of various structures at managing the inflation-output volatility trade-off and how a given structure is able to reach the best practices given the composition of the board.
The identification of a frontier capturing the best practices is therefore a tool that can play a central role to assess relative performances of central banks.
Introduction N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 4 1 4 Federal Reserve System of the USA). The sample is designed to avoid consistency issues since the period we chose to study starts with the introduction of the euro.
To achieve our objectives, we suppose that leadership matters and has an incidence on performance. This common sense intuition is supported by rigorous empirical work. For instance, individual leaders can play crucial roles in shaping the growth of nations (Jones and Olken, 2005) and well-educated leaders generate higher growth (Besley et al., 2011) . A potential mechanism for this could be that well-educated leaders are more inclined towards reforms (Dreher et al., 2009 ). This line of thoughts applies to central bankers as well. It has been shown that the vote of the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) members is significantly affected by their educational and professional achievements (Chappell et al., 2005) . Results from a larger sample indicate that central bankers'
occupational background carries a more significant weight than their education (Göhlmann and Vaubel, 2007) . It has also been shown that among central bankers from the OECD countries, academics and private sector backgrounds are influential in inflation-targeting committees, while the impact of a public sector background is important in non-targeting ones (Farvaque et al., 2011) . Studies generally put greater emphasis on professional experience than on educational background of central bankers. The relationship between the size of the monetary policy committee and inflation volatility is not innocuous, as it has been shown that countries with small committees (less than five members) tend to have inflation rates with larger deviations from trend than those with large committees, although going above five does not contribute to a further reduction in volatility (Erhard et al., 2010) .
This shows that leadership matters in central banking too. This literature mostly looked at the performance of central bankers at managing inflation. There is no reasons however to restrict ourselves to single objectives as it is well accepted that central bank's mandates would most likely include more than one goal.
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The ability of central banks at managing the inflation-output growth volatility trade-off has been the focus of Cecchetti and Krause (2002) . They derive the performance of 24 central banks and construct an efficiency frontier for each of them to finally regress the policyimplied loss of performance on independence, transparency and accountability indexes.
Subsequently they have estimated efficiency frontiers for two periods (1983-90 and 1991-98) , and found that monetary policy has become more effective in most countries (Cecchetti et al., 2006) . Krause (2007) Hasan and Mester (2008) use inflation variability as a single performance measure, and regress it on (among others) the number of governors and their turnover. They find a positive impact for both variables but only in developed countries. As a consequence, the assessment of the performance of central banks must take into account both inflation and output volatility. The impact of the composition of the monetary policy committees on this performance remains completely unexplored however and this is one of the issues at stake here. It seems obvious that the structure and composition of the monetary committee has a direct impact on its performance, the problem is just to show it.
Our results show that there are large differences in terms of efficiency despite broad similarities among the central banks in our sample (comparable degrees of independence, transparency and credibility). It does confirm however, that large institutions can evolve over time, and they notably establish that some central banks have reacted more quickly than others in front of the current crisis. Finally, we show that, among the determinants of the central banks' performance, the proportions of academics, central bankers and members coming from the financial sector stand out. Moreover, their respective role evolves: if the crisis does not seem to reveal any differences in the performance of academics, it appears that members from the financial sector have missed an occasion to reveal their expertise.
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The Approach
The basic principle of monetary policy-making can be roughly described as central bankers using resources to promote their analysis to influence monetary policy decisions and to steer the economy. Consequently, we need a method to assess their performance at doing this. We present here the methodology we develop for central bankers.
Most of the articles mentioned in the introduction are attempts to evaluate, explicitly or not, how effective central banks are at managing the inflation-growth trade-off. The use of the production view provides a different approach (Briec et al., 2012) . Although it may appear as surprising, the production approach considers that a central bank is no different than a shoe factory. Central banks use inputs such as expectations, order books surveys, knowledge of the economy identified with human capital of board members, and so on, to produce outputs such as low GDP and inflation volatility. Consequently, the performance of such decision units can be compared. To do so, we can use Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to evaluate the relative performance of central banks identified as decision-making units and thus deduce the best practices.
A central bank is often considered to be an optimizing agent. Using the identified best practice frontier we can relativize this claim. In a second stage we can go a step further and try to find a relationship between the background of the monetary policymakers in office at decision time and central banks' efficiency. In other words, we can assess the efficiency of their management based on their "human capital" (perceived as an input in the production process). To do all this, we need an understanding of the central banks' objective.
Starting from a standard loss function framework, it is assumed that central banks aim at minimizing a weighted sum of inflation and output variability. The usual quadratic form for such a loss function is: 2 L CB (π t , y t ) = λ 1 π t 2 + λ 2 y t 2 ,
where π is inflation, y is output, and the λ i 's (i= 1,2) are the policymaker's preference parameters and the subscript t denotes the time period.
Since the quadratic loss functions describing the central bank's preferences imply that the 2 For an explicit derivation of the loss function from microeconomic foundations, see Woodford (2003) .
expected losses can be simplified as the weighted sum of the variances of inflation and output growth, we have:
where E is the expected value operator, and var (.) is the variance of the indicated variable.
The key element to the success is how central banks minimize the expected loss function.
This simple view implicitly supposes that the central bank manages resources to reach a given mix of output and inflation volatility and its efficiency will be deduced by comparing this performance to the others' performance. This efficiency is influenced by the circumstances of the bank. So, it may be influenced by the composition of the monetary policy committee (MPC), whose members can rely on their skills (built through professional experience, education, cultural background, and so on). We will look at this part later in the paper.
It is important to note that the method proposed allows us to study the ability of central banks at managing the trade-off between inflation and GDP growth volatility without relying on a parametric assumption about the trade-off. The frontier of the best practices is estimated non-parametrically from the data. This frontier is then used to compare the other central bankers to those used to define the best practices.
As a consequence, an important difference with the literature is that we do not have to rely on the objectives of the central banks under scrutiny. Cecchetti et al. (2006) N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 8 2 8 defines the precision as the inverse of the variance, we can measure the performance of a bank as its capability at maximizing the precision instead of minimizing the volatility. An output-oriented measure of a central bank's efficiency is obtained by measuring the distance between an output mix (in terms of precision) given an input level, 3 and the frontier of the production possibility set. That is, θ* = max θ {θ : (x, θw) is feasible} where θ is a scalar (interpreted as the largest factor by which output can be increased given the input level x such that the production θw is still feasible) and w is a vector of the precisions of inflation and GDP growth (i.e. the inverse of inflation and GDP growth rate variances, respectively).
That is, minimizing the variance of inflation and GDP growth rate is equivalent to maximizing the precisions of these measures.
In practice, the problem to implement this procedure is that the true frontier is not observed and needs to be estimated. DEA offers a method for approximating the production possibility set. The basic principle of the methodology is that each central bank at a given time is compared to all the others (including itself) and its performance is compared to the best practices (that might be its own). For a central bank under scrutiny, called decision making unit (DMU) "0", the local approximation of the relevant production set and its performance is obtained by solving the following linear program:
where D is the number of DMUs, j, the number of outputs. The constraint on the sum of γs ensures that the frontier is the smallest convex envelope of the data.
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The most important consequence for us is that, in practice, the performance of a given central bank is compared to the best practices of the others, so the performance is just an estimate of the true performance, as we do not know if the best practices are really on the frontier or just "close" to it.
The main advantage of this procedure is that it allows us to avoid gambling on a functional form for the loss function (or the frontier expressing the trade-offs). It comes from the fact that, in the traditional approach, the quadratic loss function has to be estimated, which raises the question of the weights of the two objectives (λ 1 3 Note that x is unique and set equal to 1 at each point considered in the sample. 4 In a standard DEA model, we would introduce the inputs through a constraint of the form ∑ and λ 2 ). There are two possibilities here, either to estimate the policymakers' preference parameter (as in Krause and Méndez, 2008) , 5 or to assume that the preferences do not shift over time (as in Cecchetti et al., 2006) . As the estimated frontier is constructed by comparing each central bank with its peers, the relative weight of the two objectives are those of the banks in the reference set, i.e. the banks with the best practices, and does not have to be over-imposed on the estimation procedure because they are estimated from the best practice. 6 Finally, the peers that are considered by the estimation method are those who pursue (implicitly or explicitly) the same kind of objectives. For example, the performance of a central bank that puts more weights on a lower GDP growth rate volatility will be compared to other banks with similar objectives, in fact with the best practice with such an objective (this is the radial nature of the efficiency measure).
5 See, for estimates of preferences that focus on a single bank, e.g., Favero and Rovelli (2003) for the Fed, and Berger et al. (2005) , for the Bundesbank. 6 The variances are estimated around zero, and not around the target of the variable.
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The dataset covers nine central banks: the European Central Bank (ECB), the 
Inflation and output data
The "output" variables in the DEA model are the inverse of the inflation and output volatility of each specific country. Consequently, we need to find a measure of volatility that is specific to each country embedding each and every idiosyncrasy.
These variables do not exist as such, so we need to generate them. The strategy adopted here is to rely on the predicted value of an autoregressive conditional heterosckedastic model. To do so, we estimate for each individual country a GARCH structure for inflation and output growth and use the predicted values of the individual models to generate the inflation and output volatility.
This procedure avoids imposing a policy rule or a policy instrument, which is important in our context, in particular because our sample period includes the financial and economic crisis periods. As, during this period, several central banks However, one of the distinctive features of the database is to take into account the real number of appointed policy makers and not the statutory number of MPC members (see Table 1 ). For example, while the FOMC has twelve voting seats, Here, we consider the number of members to be ten and not twelve for these The second characteristic we consider, also linked to the number of members, is the turnover of MPC members. In the corporate governance literature, this feature has been shown to influence the work of any committee. In the case of MPCs, turnover may have a greater influence than in standard committee for two reasons. First, the turnover is linked to the tenure of MPC members and it is usually considered as one of the factors determining central bank independence. 10 The mechanism at stake is that an excessive turnover may endanger the whole MPC's credibility. Second, from a principal-agent perspective and depending on the appointment process, an increased turnover may act as an incentive for each individual member to work harder. Table 1 ). A replacement was counted as one change, whereas a resignation without replacement (or a nomination on an unfilled position) was counted as a "half-change", to account for the different nature of these changes. 11 However, as the size of the MPC differs, to take into account the relative impact of the change, the turnover variable is defined as the number of changes with respect to the effective number of members of the committee.
The number of MPC positions for a given quarter equals 78 and the total number of decision-makers who served during the analyzed time span is 194. This means that, for all MPCs, each member was replaced at least once on average over the period.
Taking into consideration the fact that not all the seats are filled in and the rotation Table 1 ). A replacement was counted as one change, whereas a resignation without replacement (or a nomination on an unfilled position) was counted as a "half-change", to account for the different nature of these changes. 11 However, as the size of the MPC differs, to take into account the relative impact of the change, the turnover variable is defined as the number of changes with respect to the effective number of members of the committee.
Taking into consideration the fact that not all the seats are filled in and the rotation 11 Thus, e.g. the joining of the President of Bank of Greece to the Governing Council of the ECB in 2001 or Bank of Slovakia (related to the enlargement of the euro area) was counted as "half a change". system in the Fed, the registered turnover is even higher.
We study the link between the age structure of central banks' elites and their inflationary performance, on the premise that the difference between members' age may influence the performance of the committee by increasing its heterogeneity.
This rests on Arrow's (1951) discussion on the heterogeneity of deciders. Age heterogeneity has been shown relevant in the corporate governance literature (Adams et al., 2010) . For the age variable, the "average year of birth" of the surveyed central bankers was 1947.
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We include gender in our set of variables as it may also have an impact on MPC members' preferences. Chappell and McGregor (2000) for example remark that female members of the FOMC tend to favor expansionary policies, while Farvaque et al. (2011), for a larger sample, find the opposite. This issue is also considered important in the corporate governance literature and in policy debates.
---Insert Table 1 Without loss of generality, a missing year of birth was approximated by the year of graduation minus 21. For instance, the privacy policy of the Bank of Canada prevented us to have access to year of birth for five governors. 13 Note that the appointed women tend to be younger than their male counterparts, which impacts on the average age. 14 system in the Fed, the registered turnover is even higher.
---Insert Table 1 For instance, the privacy policy of the Bank of Canada prevented us to have access to year of birth for five governors. 13 Note that the appointed women tend to be younger than their male counterparts, which impacts on the average age.
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---Insert Table 1 Without loss of generality, a missing year of birth was approximated by the year of graduation minus 21. For instance, the privacy policy of the Bank of Canada prevented us to have access to year of birth for five governors. 13 Note that the appointed women tend to be younger than their male counterparts, which impacts on the average age. politicians, but also a few jurists and journalists). 15 The structure of these categories for the 194 MPC members in our database is presented in Table 2 .
This structure evolved over time however, even in the relatively short time span of the present work (48 quarters). The share of public economists ranges between 24.6% and 28.4%. Remarkably, the share of academics increased to slightly more than 20% (seventeen out of 76), from roughly 16% at the beginning of the period (eleven out of 70). This evolution was first detrimental to central bank insiders, whose share decreased to slightly less than 22% in 2007, from 30% in 1999, before rising to 26% in 2010. The participation of private sector economists in the early years was close to 11.5% then dropped to 10.5%. The financial sector representatives accounted for 13% at the beginning of the period then fell slightly to 12% in 2010, while it reached its peak at 17% in 2005. The share of members categorized as "others" was very small (3-6%) during the whole period. politicians, but also a few jurists and journalists). 15 The structure of these categories for the 194 MPC members in our database is presented in Table 2 .
This structure evolved over time however, even in the relatively short time span of the present work (48 quarters). The share of public economists ranges between 24.6% and 28.4%. Remarkably, the share of academics increased to slightly more than 20% (seventeen out of 76), from roughly 16% at the beginning of the period (eleven out of 70). This evolution was first detrimental to central bank insiders, whose share decreased to slightly less than 22% in 2007, from 30% in 1999, before rising to 26% in 2010. The participation of private sector economists in the early years was close to 11.5% then dropped to 10.5%. The financial sector representatives accounted for 13% at the beginning of the period then fell slightly to 12% in 2010, while it reached its peak at 17% in 2005. The share of members categorized as "others" was very small (3-6%) during the whole period. ---Insert Table 2 here ---Among the 194 monetary policy makers we surveyed, the largest share (30.4%)
belongs to the PhD holders, followed by professors (27.4%), and masters (24.2%).
The bachelor and MBA holders represent respectively 13.7% and 4.2% of our 16 We consider education by degree and not by field (as Dreher et al., 2009, or Göhlmann and Vaubel, 2007, do) . As our sample contains both the diploma and the professional background of committee members, considering the field of education would have overlapped in many cases with the committee members' experiences, and would have led to colinearity problems. Moreover, a second argument is that a dominant part of the individuals in our sample held degrees in economics (about 90%).
always the case 17 and, obviously, the opposite is not true (not all PhD holders are Professors). Separating the two categories allows capturing the respective specific skills held by PhD holders and Professors.
---Insert Table 2 here ---Among the 194 monetary policy makers we surveyed, the largest share (30.4%) belongs to the PhD holders, followed by professors (27.4%), and masters (24.2%).
The bachelor and MBA holders represent respectively 13.7% and 4.2% of our 16 We consider education by degree and not by field (as Dreher et al., 2009, or Göhlmann and Vaubel, 2007, do) . As our sample contains both the diploma and the professional background of committee members, considering the field of education would have overlapped in many cases with the committee members' experiences, and would have led to colinearity problems. Moreover, a second argument is that a dominant part of the individuals in our sample held degrees in economics (about 90%). always the case and, obviously, the opposite is not true (not all PhD holders are Professors). Separating the two categories allows capturing the respective specific skills held by PhD holders and Professors.
---Insert ---Insert Table 2 here ---Among the 194 monetary policy makers we surveyed, the largest share (30.4%) belongs to the PhD holders, followed by professors (27.4%), and masters (24.2%).
The bachelor and MBA holders represent respectively 13.7% and 4.2% of our 17 An example is Mervyn King (Bank of England), who holds a FBA, but is a Professor at the LSE. 18 Moreover, five of the bachelors serving in 2006 were at the BJ, two at RBA and one in the British MPC; in 2010 there were 7 Bachelor holders, out of which 4 were at the BJ and three at the RBA. Another interesting remark is that the majority of bachelors (18 out of 29) represented the private sector. As such, they were probably expected to bring into their respective MPC the private economy's point of view.
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N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 18 4 the frontier, or close to it, and several points dispersed quite far from the frontier. A large proportion of the performance scores of the Fed are far from the frontier.
Overall, the best practices, in terms of performance, for this group of central banks, are the ones of the ECB and of the BoE.
---Insert Figure 2 here ---Of course, our results could be driven by the period we consider, which includes a 18
The results are presented in two steps: we first discuss efficiency and its evolution, with an emphasis on the crisis period and then we study the impact of the composition of the MPCs on their relative performance.
Efficiency analysis
Efficiency scores results for the whole sample are represented in Figure 1 while Table 3 contains the descriptive statistics. Recall that efficiency scores are larger or equal to one and a score of one is the best possible (the central bank is on the frontier and deemed efficient). Note also that the larger the score is, the worse the relative performance is. As can be seen from the figure, the distribution of the efficiency scores is concentrated between one and three. The frontier is made up from four points, three belonging to the Bank of England, and one to the ECB. There are very few extreme (i.e. very inefficient) values. Despite the fact that the majority of the points used to build the frontier are from the BoE, it is interesting to note that the least efficient point also belongs to the BoE.
---Insert Figure 1 here ------Insert Table 3 
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Efficiency analysis
---Insert Figure 1 here ------Insert Table 3 Overall, the best practices, in terms of performance, for this group of central banks, are the ones of the ECB and of the BoE.
---Insert Figure 2 here ---Of course, our results could be driven by the period we consider, which includes a deep financial and economic crisis. Hence, we also display the evolution over time of each central bank's performance in Figure 3 . Figure 3 shows the evolution across the whole period under review in the top panel, while the bottom panel focuses on the last four years (i.e. the crisis period).
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As can be seen from the top panels of Figure the frontier, or close to it, and several points dispersed quite far from the frontier. A large proportion of the performance scores of the Fed are far from the frontier.
As can be seen from the top panels of Figure Overall, the best practices, in terms of performance, for this group of central banks, are the ones of the ECB and of the BoE.
As can be seen from the top panels of Figure 
Determinants of efficiency
Understanding the sources of the differences in the efficiency scores is important.
Unfortunately, standard regression analysis is not the correct procedure to infer the impact of environmental variables on the efficiency scores. Recall that the efficiency scores are bounded below by one, and so a DEA estimator of the frontier is biased upward by construction as it envelops the observations. Secondly, the dependent variable is constructed using all the information on all central banks creating a correlation between the error terms when this variable is used in a regression. These two characteristics invalidate standard regression procedures. This problem can be circumvented however following the procedure described below.
The dependent variable bounded by one is the easiest problem to account for, as soon as we recognize that we have a truncated regression model. The second problem is more troublesome as it creates a correlation in the error term so that the estimator is biased upward. It is possible however to show that the estimator is asymptotically consistent (Kneip et al., 1998) . In this case, standard small sample inference is no longer available because the distribution of the regression parameters is not known. Simar and Wilson (2007) advocate for bootstrap simulation to obtain finite sample distribution, arguing that it is possibly the only way to achieve meaningful inference.
Knowing that the first step estimator is consistent, the focus is on the second stage regression. The procedure to obtain consistent inference is as follows. First, let ( , )
where θ i is the efficiency score, ε i an error term and φ a smooth differentiable function. We suppose that ( , )
Unfortunately, we do not have the true θ i but only ˆi θ = θ(x,w) obtained from the envelop of the data calculated in (3). These estimated efficiencies are correlated in an unknown way by construction (since θ i depends on all x and w through equation (3)). Then, equation (4) is implicitly an assumption that z i is correlated with x i and w i (these variables are all related to θ i ) and so when θ i is replaced with ˆi θ the error term in equation (4) is correlated with z i .
As pointed out by Simar and Wilson (2007) , the correlation among the ε i and depends on all x and w through equation (3)). Then, equation (4) is implicitly an assumption that z i is correlated with x i and w i (these variables are all related to θ i ) and so when θ i is replaced with ˆi θ the error term in equation (4) is correlated with z i .
As pointed out by Simar and Wilson (2007) , the correlation among the ε i and 21 between the z i and ε i do vanish asymptotically, but at a very slow rate. This implies that maximum likelihood estimates of β in the second stage truncated regression are consistent, but not root-n consistent. The correlation among the ε i does not disappear rapidly enough to allow us to use conventional inference methods based on the inverse of the information matrix. They suggest simulating the distribution using a bootstrap procedure.
Notwithstanding what we just said, we noted above that the efficiency estimator is biased upward by construction in finite sample, although it is asymptotically consistent. Consequently, it would be wise to correct for the small sample bias before bootstrapping the distribution of the estimated β. Again, bootstrap methods can be used to estimate the bias and construct a bias-corrected estimator of θ i . This allows us to get a consistent estimate of β using maximum likelihood on the biascorrected estimates of θ i on the following model:
where ˆi θ is the bias-corrected estimate of the efficiency parameter. Correcting for the bias should improve the performance of the inference procedure in a small sample. Appendix 2 details the algorithm steps, but these can readily be found in Simar and Wilson (2007) .
As explained in the first section, it is very likely that the composition and characteristics of the central bank committees have an incidence on the conduct of the policy and therefore on efficiency. We use the procedure above to study this fact.
The features that one would like to capture are multiple. Age is obviously a key factor. For instance age difference inside the committee potentially raises convergence difficulties for decisions due to generational cohort impacts. For example, members who grew up during a depression are more likely to be riskaverse (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011) . Age also carries the popular academic theory Table 4 contains the estimated parameters from the regression with a significantly different than zero assessment. 20 To interpret the results, remember that a negative sign means that a marginal increase of a given variable reduces the score leading to an increased efficiency. In other words, a negative sign must be interpreted as a positive impact on efficiency. As we have used shares for type of employment and education and obviously gender, the parameters are to be interpreted with respect to a typical individual. This reference person in our sample is a man with a Ph.D. and working in the private sector.
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From the estimates, it appears that the age-spread variable of central banks reduces efficiency. This was expected, as we interpret it as signaling a higher degree of heterogeneity among members, and thus harder-to-build consensual decisions.
Interestingly, the larger the committee is, the more efficient it is, confirming Condorcet's jury intuition. This does not hold in crisis period, however. The sign of the estimate of the interaction parameter between the number of members in the 20 The full results with the confidence intervals for every parameter are in the Appendix 2 at the end of the paper. 21 Note that we have tried to identify separately the effect of Ph.D. holders and professors, but the results were not conclusive. Consequently, the reference is an agregate of the professor and Ph.D. variables defined in Section 3. Up to a few exceptions, this amount to group all Ph.D. holders together. Master degrees were never significant and the results for this variable are omitted.
23 4 23 committee and the crisis dummy related is positive, which can be interpreted as signaling that the transaction costs related to decision-taking in committees are increasing in hard times. All in all, our results tend to show that the literature's insight that a good committee is a relatively small one (e.g., Berger et al., 2008 ) is verified only in crisis periods.
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Results from the series of estimates also reveal that the share of "insiders" from the central bank, the share of academics and the share of committee members coming from the financial sector do improve efficiency (with respect to a general private sector origin). This is not so firmly established for the share of committee members from the public sector, as the coefficient is not systematically significant.
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Interestingly, the interaction parameter between financial sector origin and crisis has a positive sign suggesting that performance is lower. We interpret this as indicating that central bankers coming from the financial sector may have lost their comparative advantage during the crisis, when macroeconomic management was at the forefront. 24 This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the same interaction with members from the academia is not significant.
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The results for education are not as clear-cut as they are for the professional backgrounds, since the coefficients are not systematically significant. However, they seem to indicate that MBA holders add a positive note to the management of a central bank, improving on efficiency. Since the reference is a Ph.D., this might be 22 Regressions introducing the squared number of members did not reveal significant non-linear effects. 23 The positive role of academics may explain why being an academic is sometimes considered as a pre-condition to be appointed in a monetary policy committee For example, article 11.2 of the statutes of the ESCB request that members of the Executive Board of the ECB are "persons of recognized standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters", which led to about half of the members on average being academics (according to our classification). 24 Besides, this may also explain why the consensus on the need for macroprudential supervision may have been so easy to reach. See Galati and Moessner (2012) on this issue. 25 This contradicts Jean-Claude Trichet's assertion that: "When the crisis came, the serious limitations of existing economic and financial models immediately became apparent. Arbitrage broke down in many market segments, as markets froze and market participants were gripped by panic. Macro models failed to predict the crisis and seemed incapable of explaining what was happening to the economy in a convincing manner. As a policy-maker during the crisis, I found the available models of limited help. In fact, I would go further: in the face of the crisis, we felt abandoned by conventional tools. In the absence of clear guidance from existing analytical frameworks, policymakers had to place particular reliance on our experience. Judgment and experience inevitably played a key role." (cited in Kirman, 2012) 23 committee and the crisis dummy related is positive, which can be interpreted as signaling that the transaction costs related to decision-taking in committees are increasing in hard times. All in all, our results tend to show that the literature's insight that a good committee is a relatively small one (e.g., Berger et al., 2008 ) is verified only in crisis periods.
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The results for education are not as clear-cut as they are for the professional backgrounds, since the coefficients are not systematically significant. However, they seem to indicate that MBA holders add a positive note to the management of a central bank, improving on efficiency. Since the reference is a Ph.D., this might be 22 Regressions introducing the squared number of members did not reveal significant non-linear effects. 23 The positive role of academics may explain why being an academic is sometimes considered as a pre-condition to be appointed in a monetary policy committee For example, article 11.2 of the statutes of the ESCB request that members of the Executive Board of the ECB are "persons of recognized standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters", which led to about half of the members on average being academics (according to our classification). 24 Besides, this may also explain why the consensus on the need for macroprudential supervision may have been so easy to reach. See Galati and Moessner (2012) on this issue. 25 This contradicts Jean-Claude Trichet's assertion that: "When the crisis came, the serious limitations of existing economic and financial models immediately became apparent. Arbitrage broke down in many market segments, as markets froze and market participants were gripped by panic. Macro models failed to predict the crisis and seemed incapable of explaining what was happening to the economy in a convincing manner. As a policy-maker during the crisis, I found the available models of limited help. In fact, I would go further: in the face of the crisis, we felt abandoned by conventional tools. In the absence of clear guidance from existing analytical frameworks, policymakers had to place particular reliance on our experience. Judgment and experience inevitably played a key role." (cited in Kirman, 2012) attributable to a diversification effect.
---Insert Table 4 here ---
The coefficient attached to the share of women is generally significant and positive, which means that women tend to weigh negatively on efficiency. This result is consistent with previous results from Farvaque et al. (2011) , who showed that female monetary policymakers tend to be more inflation averse than their male counterparts. If true, this implies that they will push more in one direction and will be less inclined to accept a trade-off between the two objectives we consider here.
Finally, it appears that a higher turnover is associated with a lower performance, which can be interpreted as leaving more room to less experienced policymakers or simply destabilizing the routines a group may have acquired. Nevertheless, these results tend to confirm that leadership matters in central banks.
It is noteworthy that central banks deemed inflation targeters are less efficient than Tables N a t i o n a l B a n k o f P o l a n d 24 24 attributable to a diversification effect.
It is noteworthy that central banks deemed inflation targeters are less efficient than their counterparts. This may be due to a stronger focus on inflation than on output stabilization, a feature that reduces their global capacity to stabilize the economy.
No central bank ever claimed to focus exclusively on inflation and there is no evidence allowing us to make a clear-cut statement on the subject. However, our results give more weight to existing evidence showing that inflation targeting central banks put a larger weight on inflation (see, e.g., Kuttner and Posen, 2012 , for the US and the UK, Otto and Voss, 2011, for Australia, or Creel and Hubert, 2011, for Sweden 26 ). Hence, our results tend to add caution on the consensus that seems to build gradually towards the adoption of inflation targets.
27
26 Although Creel and Hubert (2012) claim that the Swedish central bank put a lower focus on inflation after the adoption of the inflation targeting, their results show that the relative weight of inflation with regard to the output gap has been strongly reinforced. Also, Kuttner and Posen (2012) reveal a faster adjustment of inflation forecasters in the UK than in the US, which can be interpreted as revealing that they expect the Bank of England to be more concerned with inflation (or more quickly concerned, should she react to an output shock). 27 Although strong voices have, since at least Friedman (2004) , cautioned against the adoption of inflation targets.
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Conclusion
This paper builds on the literature focusing on the role of leaders to show that, in central banks, too, leaders matter. Using tools from production theory, our criterion is the efficiency of central bankers at managing the inflation-output volatility tradeoff, relying on a DEA procedure to define the efficiency frontier.
Looking at the determinants of efficiency, we also show that the educational and occupational background of leaders do influence their performance, with academics and central bankers bearing a substantial weight in the explanation for a given efficiency score. A further result of our analysis is that the adoption of an inflationtargeting regime may come at a cost in terms of higher output volatility, leading to a much less efficient management of the inflation-output volatility trade-off. Finally, it clearly appears that the crisis struck heavily central bankers and derailed their performance, although some central banks have been able to recover sooner than others, as the Bank of England and the European Central Bank exemplify by reverting to their pre-crisis efficiency performance.
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